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The ECB has been forced – in part by 
the COVID-19 crisis – to review its bi-
lateral arrangements with foreign cen-
tral banks. But the recent changes made 
by the ECB fall short of the Europe-
an Commission’s ambitions to boost 
the international role of the euro. We 
suggest the ECB should put in place 
an alternative three-pillar frame-
work to improve the international role 
of the ECB and cement its pivotal role 
in the international financial system. 
In a new paper released on January 19, 
the European Commission (EC) reit-
erated its commitment to strengthen 
the international role of the euro. This 
is part of a long-standing plan that has 
been followed by little action so far. Al-
though the report is broad, it does not 
mention actions to be taken by the 
ECB –  despite the fact that its role as 
a global lender of last resort is becom-
ing ever more important to the inter-
national financial system.
Since the economic shock of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, the ECB has 
overhauled its euro liquidity provision 
to foreign non-euro central banks. The 
overhaul has involved reviewing exist-
ing arrangements and extending  a c -
cess to euro swap and repo facilities to 
non-euro area central banks – thereby 
helping the ECB to stabilize prices and 
mitigate financial stability risks do-
mestically and abroad.
During the 2008 global financial cri-
sis and its aftermath, the ECB had to 
make hard choices about its FX swap 
policy and adopted a very conservative 
line, precisely when it was enjoying the 
generous support of the Federal Re-
serve’s own US dollar liquidity lines. 
Indeed, between 2009 and 2011, the 
ECB refused to extend swap lines to 
Hungary and Poland when they were 
in a financial crisis and in need of euro 
liquidity, or to Latvia when the Swiss 
National Bank and the Swedish Riks-
bank respectively rose to the challenge 
of effectively offering support when 
the ECB should have also been there to 
help. 
The new changes introduced by the 
ECB due to the COVID-19 pandem-
ic do not go far enough in creating the 
framework to provide euro liquidity to 
those who may need it. The ECB’s bi-
lateral lending framework – via swaps 
and repos – continues to create double 
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and lacks accountability and trans-
parency. The ECB falls short of being 
a lender of last resort for financial sys-
tems that are dependent on euro li-
quidity. As a result, the ECB is failing to 
reduce financial stability risks and to 
promote the international role of the 
euro as much as it should. 
In this paper, we first review in de-
tail the shortcomings of the ECB’s new 
framework, which was announced on 
August 19, 2020. We then outline a 
more rigorous and systematic global 
Lender of Last Resort (LoLR) function 
based on three pillars: 
1. A global and European network of 
FX swap lines to ensure appropriate 
distribution of euros and other hard 
currencies across the EU and the in-
ternational financial system; 
2. A structural repo facility for foreign 
central banks to ensure the global li-
quidity of euro area collateral; and 
3. A discretionary emergency assis-
tance facility to provide financial assis-
tance to foreign countries undergoing 
a balance of payment crisis.
DOUBLE STANDARDS 
FOR EU MEMBER STATES 
In the hierarchy of instruments avail-
able to global lenders of last resort, 
FX swaps rank higher than repos. FX 
swaps create stability by protecting 
against volatility. In an FX swap, two 
countries’ central banks “lend” each 
other some of their own currency. 
Let’s take a swap between Bulgaria 
and the ECB as an example. The Bul-
garian central bank has a euro depos-
it and that account gets credited with 
the agreed sum in euros, at an agreed 
exchange rate and for an agreed peri-
od. Bulgaria pays interest on this loan 
of currency back to the ECB. But in re-
turn for euro liquidity it also creates 
a corresponding Bulgarian lev loan to 
the ECB. These FX swaps ensure the 
flow of hard currency/euro liquidity 
where and when it is needed and pre-
vent financial instability from tempo-
rary liquidity shortages from setting in.
In contrast, repos are more onerous 
for the borrowing central banks for a 
variety of reasons. Sticking with our 
example, the Bulgarian central bank 
needs to have euro-denominated se-
curities – rather than its own domes-
tic currency – to post as collateral to 
the ECB to receive euro liquidity in re-
turn. Because securities are consid-
ered more risky than cash, the repo 
loan may also be subject to “haircuts” 
on collateral. To account for variation 
in the market value of these securities, 
haircuts may be complemented by a 
daily variation margin. Repo collater-
al is more difficult to service because, 
when the price of collateral falls, the 
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the ECB additional collateral to make 
up the value of the swap again. 
The ECB resorts to double standards 
in its treatment of EU member states 
by offering liquidity on different terms 
to some nations. These double stan-
dards can be difficult to understand. 
For example, why would the National 
Bank of Hungary enjoy a repo line and 
not the National Bank of Poland? Why 
would the Danish National Bank enjoy 
a full swap line rather than a mere re-
po line when Denmark has opted out 
from joining the single currency, while 
Romania, which is openly committed 
to entering the eurozone, only enjoys 
a repo arrangement? As a  matter of 
principle, all countries in ERM2 – the 
managed exchange rate mechanism 
used in the transition period before 
a country joins the single currency – 
should enjoy a swap line from the ECB. 
There are numerous such examples of 
double standards. But there seems to 
be a political rationale beyond financial 
stability considerations for these dis-
tinctions. This could explain why Cro-
atia (an EU member state) would enjoy 
a swap line while Serbia and Albania 
only have a repo line. But then why 
leave out Montenegro, which is on the 
EU accession track and has unilaterally 
adopted the euro as its currency? 
Does the ECB introduce a political 
judgement on the various countries’ 
accession prospects? Or is it that the 
ECB does not want to sanction unilat-
eral adoption of its currency? Wheth-
er it is one or the other, it should be 
spelled out with more clarity to justi-
fy the policy.
THE IMPORTANCE OF 
REPO LINES FOR FOR-
EIGN CENTRAL BANKS
Because swaps rank higher than re-
pos in the hierarchy of financial in-
struments, it is usually the instrument 
of choice for liquidity transactions 
between central banks. Repos are still 
the preferred method by which the 
Central Bank offers liquidity to com-
mercial banks, adjusting the eligible 
collateral and the haircut proportional-
ly to the perceived counter-party risk, 
the quality of the collateral, and the 
daily variation in the price of collateral. 
FX swaps are less onerous for count-
er-party central banks because there is 
an established exchange rate between 
currencies. That means collater-
al doesn’t need a haircut to match the 
value of the liquidity received. Swaps 
are, in principle, reserved for central 
banks whose currency is more trust-
ed or stable. However, this judgement 
of trust establishes a political distinc-
tion between trusted official peers and 
less trusted ones. This process of mak-
ing distinctions is questionable within 
the EU and for countries on the EU ac-
cession track. 
The creation of the Eurosystem repo 
facility for central banks (EUREP), fol-
lows a similar move that was made by 
the US Federal Reserve, and includes 
two important functions that should 
be disentangled: 
1. An emergency facility to deliver euro 
liquidity in times of distress and help 
liquify the foreign exchange reserves 
of central banks at Europe’s periphery.
2. A structural facility to improve the 
flow of euro collateral and offer both 
repo and reverse repo windows to for-
eign central banks outside of Europe 
to encourage the use of euro assets in 
their reserves as a liquid store of value.
The ECB should instead consider a 
simpler framework with three distinct 
facilities, detailed below:
1. A Global and European FX Swap 
Line Network
This would put in place a permanent 
and unlimited swap line facility with 
the G10 and all the EU’s central banks, 
without discrimination. The heart of 
this agreement would essentially be 
the current permanent core swap line 
network (Federal Reserve, ECB, Bank of 
England (BoE), Bank of Canada (BoC), 
Bank of Japan (BoJ)). 
In practice, this would see the ECB 
play a nodal role in distributing US 
dollars and euros to all European cen-




STA N D I N G  
G LO B A L  
FX SWA P L I N E
P E R M A N E N T  
SWA P L I N E S  
TO A L L  
E U CO U N T R I E S
TEMPORARY SWAP  
L INE FOR TRADE  






















• Bank of  
Mexico  
• Bank  




 A NEW PERMANENT SWAP NETWORK
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USD and EUR across the European fi-
nancial system.
The ECB would continue to have a bi-
lateral swap line with the People’s Bank 
of China (PBoC) designed to facilitate 
trade and investment flows rather than 
financial stability. This would both fa-
cilitate the internationalization of the 
RMB, which serves the purpose of a 
more multipolar, international mon-
etary system and expand the use of 
the euro in China while promoting a 
more multipolar international mone-
tary system.
2. A Structural Repo and Reverse 
Repo Facility for Foreign Central 
Banks
The ECB should offer temporary and 
limited repo lines to selected count-
er-parties for the purpose of facilitat-
ing trade and investment settlement. 
This would be particularly useful, for 
instance, for countries that trade with 
Europe but in which the banking sys-
tem does not facilitate international 
commerce (think of African coun-
tries with weak correspondent bank-
ing links); or for countries with highly 
euro-ized banking systems that are 
not in the EU, such as Serbia, Turkey, 
or Lebanon.
Opening a standing repo and reverse 
repo line to all foreign central banks 
(with varying haircuts) would offer 
advanced custody and payment ser-
vices in euros to all central banks. But 
it would also ensure the highest pos-
sible level of international euro collat-
eral fluidity, which is important for the 
conduct of the ECB’s domestic policy 
and the control of its short-term se-
cured funding rates.
3. A Discretionary Emergency Assis-
tance Facility
The ECB should also consider creat-
ing a standing FX swap and/or repo 
facility that can be accessed in cases 
of distinct country-level distress – in 
particular alongside existing financial 
assistance programs such as the IMF 
and the EU Macro Financial Assistance 
Programme. While it may sound like 
this facility would duplicate the IMF’s 
work, in the 1980s and 1990s it was 
rather common for IMF programs to 
be complemented by Federal Reserve 
swap arrangements. When these be-
came harder to come by, G10 cen-
tral banks were called on to step in via 
the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS). This happened in 1995 during 
Mexico’s peso crisis, which led to a $50 
billion bailout package. An emergency 
assistance facility could be very use-
ful today, for example to address Leba-
non’s financial cum banking crisis. 
CONCLUSION
The European Union wants to pro-
mote the international role of the euro 
in order to reap the benefits of issu-
ing a true international reserve cur-
rency and provide a more stable and 
multipolar international monetary or-
der, but the ECB’s framework for swap 
and repo lines is not up to the task. It 
should be revised profoundly to pro-
vide a simpler and more systematic 
set of instruments to limit potential li-
quidity risks in euros across the world 
– and to expand the role of the euro 
among foreign central banks. 
The ECB has an opportunity to ex-
pand its pivotal place in the interna-
tional monetary and financial system 
as one of the few central banks that is 
connected to both the People’s Bank 
of China (PBoC) and to the US Fed-
eral Reserve, but, in order to do so, it 
must accept further operational and 
counter-party risks. These are inev-
itable if the euro is to rise as a lead-
ing international reserve currency and 
help reshape the international mone-
tary order.
A DISCRETIONARY SWAP WINDOW FOR  
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